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COMMENTS
AMENDING THE FOREIGN CORRUPT




In 1976, following leads provided by the Watergate Special Prose-
cutor's Office,' the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") re-
ported high levels of questionable and illegal payments by United States
corporations to foreign officials. 2 In spite of evidence that unilateral ac-
tion to halt such activity would inevitably place United States compa-
nies at a competitive disadvantage in overseas markets vis h vis foreign
companies which were free to resort to such payments,3 Congress en-
acted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19774 (the "FCPA" or the
"Act"). It sought "to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to re-
store public confidence in the integrity of the American business sys-
I See Foreign and Corrupt Bribes: Heanngs on S 3133 Before the Senate Committe on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Afairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign and Corrupt
Bribes]. Senator Proxmire observed that "[t]he wave of disclosure [of overseas payments] is
really the result of some threads that began unravelling when the Watergate Special Prosecu-
tor got into domestic bribery." See also Multinational Corporations and Foreign Polig: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., Part 12, 1 (1975).
2 See SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 642, pt. II, at 2 (May 19, 1976). [hereinafter cited as SEC Report]; S.
REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 123 CONG. REC. 13059 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S.
Rep. No. 114]; H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 123 CONG. REC. 31404 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 640]; Foreign Corrupt Practices andDomestic andForeign Invest-
ment Disclosure Hearings on S. 305 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
3 Developments in the Law - Securities Regulation - Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 19
HARV. INT'L. LJ. 726 (1978). But cf. 123 CONG. RFAc. 36305 (1977), where testimony before
Congress indicated that American companies did not need to engage in foreign bribery in
order to remain competitive in international markets.
4 Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. 1, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m,
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff).
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tem."'5 The method by which the FCPA is designed to end illegal
payments by Americans to foreign government officials is twofold: first,
the FCPA criminalizes certain forms of foreign bribery committed by
United States citizens, corporations, and other entities; and second, the
FCPA imposes accounting standards and internal controls upon report-
ing companies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the 1934
Act") .6
Since the enactment of the FCPA in 1977, there has been criticism
that ambiguities in the Act cause many companies to forego legitimate
business opportunities to ensure compliance with the Act's provisions.7
In an effort to address these criticisms, Congress is considering legisla-
tion which, inzter alia, attempts to clarify the major ambiguities of the Act
and consolidate enforcement of the Act's antibribery provisions in the
Department of Justice.8 The Act would be renamed the "Business Ac-
counting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act."9
This Comment will examine the proposed legislation in light of the
history, policy objectives and present enforcement of the FCPA and will
reach two conclusions. First, although the proposed bill clarifies the ma-
jor ambiguities in the Act, it also creates a number of loopholes which
should be tightened in order to deter successfully the egregious foreign
bribery which prompted the enactment of the FCPA in 1977. For ex-
ample, both the FCPA and the proposed bill exempt certain "grease"
payments from the prohibitions against illegal payments, although the
latter defines these payments more clearly. To avoid entangling ques-
tions of the intent or custom underlying the payment, however, a dollar
limit or minimal value test should be established.
Second, this Comment concludes that the consolidation of enforce-
ment responsibilities of the Act in the Justice Department is crucial to
the consistent enforcement of the antibribery provisions. Although the
SEC has agreed not to sue companies which proceed with transactions
5 S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 4. Accord 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1909 (Dec.
21, 1977).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
7 See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplifxation Act: Joint Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Securities and the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetag Poliy of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Afairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 385-87 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 708].
8 S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S2126 (daily ed. Mar. 12,1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as S. 708]. Senator John Chafee proposed the legislation, which the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs amended after hearings. See S. REP. No. 209,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 10-11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 209]. In November,
1981, the Senate passed the bill, which is currently pending in the Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce.
9 S. 708, supra note 8, § 101.
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that have been approved by the Department of Justice, this does not
necessarily imply agreement with the Justice Department decisions.
Thus, two companies involved in identical transactions could be treated
differently if one firm did not seek Justice Department approval.
Thus, if the proposed Act is truly to further the original objectives
of Congress, it must be revised. Ambiguities.and inconsistencies cur-
rently in the Act serve only to confuse American corporations and hin-
der their international business transactions. Congress should act
promptly to resolve the remaining problems in the Act in order to pro-
vide American businesses with a clear set of guidelines for determining
the legality of payments to foreign officials.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FCPA
Congress enacted the FCPA after extensive study of the issues sur-
rounding illegal or improper payments by American companies in con-
nection with their overseas business.10 The problem of foreign bribery
by American corporations first came to light during investigations by
t'he Watergate Special Prosecutor's office into illegal domestic campaign
contributions."' An SEC inquiry into these illegal contributions re-
vealed that the payments were made possible by falsified corporate
financial statements which concealed the source and application of cor-
porate funds. 12 Additionally, the SEC investigations revealed the exist-
ence of "slush funds" from which money was discharged for bribes and
other illicit purposes. 13
10 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 114,supra note 2; H.R. REP. No. 640,supra note 2; H.R. REP. No.
831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 38466, 38776 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 831]; S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 94-1031]; Hearings on Political Contributions to Foreign Governments Before the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporation of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 12
(1975); Hearings on the Activities ofAmerican Multinational Corporations Abroad Before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Activities of American Multinational Corporations
Abroad]; Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Offials: Hearings Before the Senate Committe on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Afairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Foreign Payments Disclosure.: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Payments Disclosure]; Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Afairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Unlawful Corporate Payments Act
of 1977" Hearings Before the House Committee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
11 SEC Report, supra note 2, at 2.
12 Id. See also Note, Corruption and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 158, 159 (1979).
t3 Note, supra note 12; SEC Report, supra note 2, at 3. The SEC also became aware of
bribery through routine investigations, such as that conducted in SEC v. United Brands,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,420, in which the SEC investi-
gated United Brands following the suicide of its Chief Executive Officer, Eli Block. The SEC
1742 [Vol. 73
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The SEC believed that these corporate contributions were of suffi-
cient interest to investors to warrant disclosure. Moreover, the existence
of the hidden funds made financial statements filed with the SEC inac-
curate.14 Consequently, the SEC initiated enforcement and voluntary
disclosure programs.
In the enforcement program, the SEC brought a number of injunc-
tive actions against corporations. In the majority of cases, the corpora-
tions consented to the entry of a judgment of permanent injunction
without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint.15 The
consent decrees usually ordered the corporation not to make any future
payments that would violate the federal securities laws. In addition, the
corporation agreed to establish a special review committee to examine
the payments made, analyze the corporation's accounting procedures,
and make recommendations to its board of directors.16
The SEC, however, was unsure of its statutory authority to conduct
the enforcement program and therefore began a voluntary disclosure
program.1 7 It encouraged corporations which chose to participate in
this program to conduct their own investigations and audits to uncover
bribes, illegal political contributions, or other questionable payments.' 8
By the time Congress enacted the FCPA, more than 450 corporations
inquiry disclosed that United Brands, one of the world's largest banana producers, had paid
an Honduran official $1.25 million in order to reduce a new export tax on bananas. United
Brands had paid the official through a foreign subsidiary, which had accounted for the pay-
ment on its books as "commissions" and had deposited the money in a Swiss bank account for
the official. See Comment, The Foreign Cormpt Practices Act: Curse or Cure?, 19 AM. Bus. LJ. 73,
74 (1981); Hearings on the Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 10, at
37.
14 Note, supra note 12, at 158; SEC Report, supra note 2, at 3.
15 SEC Report, supra note 2, at 4.
16 Id.; Note, In Search of an International Solution to Bribery: The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 on Corporate Behavior, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 359, 360-61 (1979).
The consent decree entered into by Lockheed is a well-publicized example. As a result of this
consent decree, Lockheed was permanently enjoined from future violations and was required
to establish a special committee of non- management directors or other unaffiliated persons to
investigate the unlawful use of corporate funds. In addition, Lockheed was required to take
appropriate action based on the special committee's findings and draft a statement of corpo-
rate policy to be placed on file with the SEC. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,509.
17 See Note, supra note 16, at 361, where the author notes that the enforcement program
was criticized as being entirely outside the jurisdiction of the SEC because the decrees prohib-
ited substantive conduct and sought regulation of the corporation's accounting practices. See
also Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1, 4-7 (1976); Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Oftcials Under the Securities Act, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1848, 1853 (1976).
18 Note, supra note 16, at 361; SEC Report, supra note 2, at 6-13. The investigation was to
be conducted by independent outside counsel and auditors who were required to answer to a
committee of independent or outside board members. A final report was to be filed with the
SEC on Form 8-K.
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had voluntarily disclosed questionable or illegal payments to foreign
government officials, politicians, and political parties, totalling in excess
of $300 million.' 9
The voluntary program also encountered a number of problems. 20
First, the program overestimated the power of independent directors
and outside counsel to compel disclosure of payments. Second, the con-
sent decrees often contained ambiguous language. Finally, because the
Freedom of Information Act and newspaper reporting prevented the
SEC from keeping the disclosures completely confidential, corporations
became increasingly reluctant to comply with the voluntary disclosure
program.21
As a result, Congress held hearings on the question of improper
payments to foreign governmient officials by United States corpora-
tions. 22 A plethora of policy considerations were presented to Congress
19 See note 2 supra; see also Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Problems of Extraterritorial
Application, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 690 n.6 (1979). Citing various news magazine
articles, the author provides examples of some of these questionable or illegal payments. Bell
Helicopter, a subsidiary of Textron, Inc., reported kicking back $297,000 to an official in
Ghana to facilitate an aircraft sale in that country. A $2.9 million payment by Bell in con-
nection with the sale of helicopters to Iran was also reported. In addition, Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion reported spending $10.3 million on gifts, entertainment and other items related to
political activity in the United States and abroad, inluding $4 million given to the political
party of the late South Korean President Park Chung Hee. General Tire and Rubber Com-
pany disclosed that its affiliates paid $18,600 to a Venezuelan government official to obtain
confidential tax returns of competitors. General Tire also gave $500,000 to Mexican purchas-
ing agents to escape taxes and paid $6 million in "consultants' fees" and $4.4 million in
"commissions" in Algeria to win contracts and ensure the cooperation of customs officials.
Exxon Corporation acknowledged paying $1.2 million in 15 foreign countries "to secure or
influence government action." Exxon's Italian subsidiary made unauthorized commercial
payments and political contributions totalling $19 million. Also, Westinghouse Electric Cor-
poration reported improper payments to a foreign business agent in Manila in order to obtain
a major share of Philippine nuclear plant construction contracts. See Holt & Wolcott, The
Missing Memo, NEWSWEEK 22 (May 22, 1978); The Philippines: Talesfrom Disneyland, TIME 56
(Jan. 23, 1978).
20 Note, supra note 16, at 362.
21 See, e.g., supra note 19; Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 331.
22 See supra note 10. See also Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.- A Unilat-
eral Solution to an International Problem, 12 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 227, 229 n.7 (1979) where the
author notes that at the beginning of the Senate hearings, some Cabinet members believed
that pre-FCPA laws, such as the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976, Export-Import Bank regulations, and various tax laws were adequate to deter
foreign bribes. Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon thought that the activities of the
IRS, SEC, and Departments of State and Defense represented a significant response to the
problems of foreign corrupt practices. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic andForeign Investment
Disclosure,supra note 10, at 91-93. In addition, Secretary of Commerce Elliott Richardson felt
that new legislation on foreign corrupt practices was not needed at the time. Id. at 84. Lash-
brooke notes, however, that as the hearings proceeded, the attitude of many of these officials
changed. Secretary of Commerce Richardson began to believe that the most vigorous en-
forcement of existing laws would be inadequate. Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Oftiials, supra note
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during these hearings, which culminated in the adoption of the FCPA.
The legislative history provides at least five distinct policy objectives.
First, Congress believed that the payment of bribes was counter to
the moral expectations and values of the American public. 23 Second,
Congress was concerned over the public scandals engendered by bribery
and the resulting foreign policy problems for the United States when
friendly governments were embarrassed.24 Third, Congress wanted to
prevent the distortion of commercial competition caused by bribery.25
Fourth, Congress wished to prevent the spread of corruption in friendly
governments. 26 Fifth, Congress sought to minimize foreign mistrust of
American business and to improve the American reputation for honesty
in business dealings. 27
In contrast to the policy considerations in favor of prohibiting cor-
porate bribery of foreign officials, two major arguments were advanced
to justify corporate payments to foreign officials. First, it was argued
that bribery is an accepted business practice in many foreign markets.28
For example, in Latin America and the Middle East, local agents are
customarily used to negotiate contracts with local governments. Prior to
the enactment of the FCPA, a Defense Security Assistance Agency
memorandum suggested that firms should pay large fees to local agents
and should give the agents discretion to distribute the money among
local officials.29 The larger the fee, the greater the "'influence' [which]
can be applied to all personnel in the governmental decision-making
10, at 39-67. Set also infra note 79. Richardson also reported that President Ford believed that
the current law was insufficient to deal adequately with foreign corrupt practices. Id.
23 See S. REP. No. 114,supra note 2, at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 640,supra note 2, at 5; S. REP.
No. 1031, supra note 10, at 3-4.
24 H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 5. The House Report summarized the damage to
the nation's foreign policy interests as follows:
[Revelations of corporate bribery] shook the Government of Japan to its political foun-
dations and gave opponents of close ties between the United States and Japan an effec-
tive weapon with which to drive a wedge between the two nations. In another instance,
Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands was forced to resign from his official position ....
In Italy, alleged payments. . . to officials of the Italian Government eroded public sup-
port for the Government and jeopardized U.S. foreign policy, not only with respect to
Italy and the Mediterranean area, but with respect to the entire NATO alliance as well.
The report also stated that exposure of corporate bribery could damage a company's image,
lead to costly lawsuits, cause the cancellation of contracts, and result in the expropriation of
overseas assets. See also S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 3-4; S. REP. No. 1031, supra note 10,
at 3.
25 See S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 4-5; S. REP. No. 1031,supra note 10, at 3-4; H.R.
REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 5.
26 H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 5.
27 See Foreign and Corrupt Bribes, supra note 1, at 63, 68.
28 See N. JACOBY, P. NEHENKIS & R. ELLIS, Bribey and Extortion in World Business 6-7
(1977).
29 See Note, supra note 12, at 160; Hearings on the Activities of American Multinational Corpora-
lions Abroad, supra note 10, at 100.
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chain."'30 In addition, failure to make these payments could offend the
foreign firm and result in the termination of the contract or venture.
Second, the argument was advanced that the unilateral regulation
of bribery would not necessarily improve business morality. Rather,
such regulation would result in a loss of business to foreign competitors
who were free to engage in payments to foreign officials.3 ' Further,
payments considered bribes by the United States might be considered
legitimate commissions in the foreign country in which they were made.
Upon balancing these arguments, Congress determined that it was
necessary to enact a strong anti-bribery statute in order to alter the be-
havior of United States corporations abroad. Consequently, Congress
passed the FCPA, which President Carter signed into effect on Decem-
ber 19, 1977.32 Since the FCPA was so broadly drafted, however, many
American businesses were unable to determine whether their actions fell
within the parameters of the Act.
III. THE PROVISIONS OF THE FCPA
A. IN GENERAL
Although included by amendment within the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the FCPA expands the traditional scope of the 1934 Act by
applying to all domestic concerns, 33 rather than only to reporting com-
panies. 34 As enacted, the Act consists primarily of three sections: sec-
tion 102 contains the accounting and disclosure provisions of the Act;
sections 103 and 104 contain the anti-bribery provisions prohibiting im-
proper payments to foreign officials.
Section 10235 requires issuers of securities registered under section
30 Hearings on the Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 10, at 101.
31 See Note, supra note 16, at 363.
32 On May 5, 1977, the Senate Bill, S. 305, sponsored by Senators Proxmire and Williams,
was considered and unanimously passed by the Senate. 123 CONG. REc. 13816 (1977). On
November 1, 1977, the corresponding House bill, H.R. 3815, was considered and passed by
the House. 123 CONG. REc. 36303 (1977). These two bills differed in many important re-
spects. See H.R. REP. No. 831, supra note 10, at 9. The compromise, which became the
FCPA, was worked out in conference. The final bill passed the Senate on December 6, 1977,
123 CONG. REc. 36306 (1977), and passed the House on the following day. 123 CONG. REC.
36308 (1977).
33 The FCPA defines a "domestic concern" as:
any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or . . . any
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorpo-
rated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the
United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1).
34 A reporting company is an issuer of securities which is registered or required to file
reports under the 1934 Act. Id. § 78dd-l(a).
35 Id. § 78m(b)(2). Section 102 is the new § 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act.
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12 or required to file under section 15(d) of the 1934 Act to (1) make
and keep books and records, in "reasonable detail," which accurately and
fairly reflect the firm's transactions and asset dispositions,36 and (2) de-
vise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that certain standards will be met in ac-
counting for the firm's assets. Section 102 was intended to prevent the
use of off-the-books "slush funds" from which payments were made to
foreign officials to influence the officials' decisions.3 7
The congressional conference committee adopted a standard of rea-
•sonableness, recognizing that any absolute standard would result in un-
realistic demands on management.38 The committee agreed that
management's decision as to the reasonableness of the firm's recordkeep-
ing and internal control systems should be based upon a cost/benefit
analysis which considers such factors as the size of the business, the di-
versity of operations, the degree of centralization of financial and oper-
ating management, and the amount of contact by top management with
day-to-day operations.3 9 The committee did, however, make absolute
the obligation to have and maintain internal controls; this obligation
applies to all reporting companies, regardless of whether the company
operates abroad.40
Sections 103 and 104 contain the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA. Section 103 provides criminal penalties for payment by a securi-
ties issuer, or certain persons connected with an issuer, to any foreign
official, foreign political party, or candidate for foreign political office, if
the purpose of the payment is to induce the foreign official to use his or
her influence to assist the company in obtaining or retaining business.41
36 Id. (Emphasis added.) The conference committee qualified the "accurate and fair"
standard by requiring only "reasonable detail." See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
37 See SEC Report, supra note 2, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 831, supra note 10, at 10.
38 H.R. REP. No. 831, supra note 10, at 10.
39 S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 6.
40 A discussion of the accounting provisions of the Act in further detail is beyond the
scope of this comment.
41 This section (except for § 103(b)(2)) amends § 30 of the 1934 Act and establishes § 30A.
The section, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to
section 12 of this title or which is required to file reports under section 15(d) of this title,
or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof
acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authoriza-
tion of the giving of anything of value to
(1) any foreign official for purposes of -
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity,
including a decision to fail to perform his official functions; or
(B)inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality,
1982] 1747
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Also included in the class of recipients to whom payment is prohibited
are persons who the issuer knows or has reason to know will directly or
indirectly offer the payment for prohibited purposes.42 Section 104, the
domestic concerns section, contains identical provisions for persons and
domestic enterprises other than reporting companies. 43
An issuer or domestic concern convicted of violating the anti-brib-
ery provisions of the Act is subject to severe penalties. Upon conviction,
a reporting company or domestic concern may be fined up to one mil-
lion dollars. 4 Individuals convicted of wilfully violating the Act may be
fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for up to five years, or both.45 Addi-
tionally, in accordance with the SEC's policy against corporate indem-
nification of fines imposed for willful violations of the securities laws, the
FCPA does not allow a company to indemnify convicted officers, direc-
tors, shareholders, employees, or agents.46
At present, the SEC and the Justice Department share responsibil-
ity for the enforcement of the FPCA. The SEC has the duty to enforce
the accounting provisions of section 102 and is responsible for the civil
enforcement and regulatory implementation of section 103. To carry
out its enforcement duties, the SEC may conduct investigations, initiate
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person;
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof of any candidate for foreign political
office for purposes of -
(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in its or his
official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform its or his official functions; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influence with a for-
eign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of
such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining busines for or with, or directing
business to, any person; or
(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion of such
money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any
foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for
foreign political office, for purposes of -
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform
his or its official functions; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to use
his or its influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality;
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with or directing
business to, any person.
42 This covers situations where consultants or commercial agents are employed abroad. S.
REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 10.
43 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. See note 33 supra.
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(1), 78dd-2(b)(1)(A).
45 Id. §§ 78ff(c)(2), (3), 78dd-2(b)(1)(B), 78dd-2(b)(2), (3). These individuals include any
officer, director, or stockholder acting on behalf of the issuer and, predicated upon a judicial
finding of an issuer's liability, an issuer's employees or agents who willfully conduct prohib-
ited activities.
46 Id. §§ 78dd-2(b)(4), 78ff(c)(4).
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administrative proceedings, and request injunctive and other equitable
relief from the courts.47 The SEC must refer possible criminal cases to
the Justice Department, which also has responsibility for the civil and
criminal enforcement of section 104, the domestic concerns provisions.48
Although the Act makes no express provision for a private right of ac-
tion, the courts are not explicitly prohibited from implying such an
action.49
B. AMBIGUITIES IN THE FCPA
Controversy has surrounded the FCPA since its enactment in 1977.
Critics of the Act have argued that the lack of clarity in the Act's provi-
sions and the incorporation into the statute of standards which are not
realistic in the practical world of international commerce have resulted
in excessive costs and significant losses in foreign sales, service, and con-
struction contracts.50 They contend that many firms, in fear of violating
the Act, are foregoing legitimate business opportunities. Since there is
practically no interpretive case law or regulatory history under the
Act,5 1 there is much confusion as to whether the anti-bribery provisions
of the Act apply to certain commercial transactions.
One of the major ambiguities concerns the circumstances under
which a company is liable for the acts of its officers, directors, employees,
agents, stockholders, subsidiaries, or partners. Under the Act, it is clear
that stockholders, acting in the company's behalf, may be liable for vio.
lations of the anti-bribery provisions.5 2 It is not clear, however, whether
officers and directors must be acting on behalf of the company or
47 S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 11-12; H.R. REP. No. 640, sufra note 2, at 9-10.
48 H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 9. If the Attorney General believes that any domes-
tic concern, or its officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder is engaged in or is about to
engage in an act prohibited by the anti-bribery provisions, the Attorney General may seek a
permanent or temporary injunction against the offending party.
49 It is clear that the House intended for a private cause of action to exist. H.R. REP. No.
640,supra note 2, at 10. The Senate deliberately refrained from taking a position on this issue.
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,701. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-85
(1975), the Supreme Court set forth four factors to be used by the federal courts in determin-
ing whether a private right of action may be implied in a federal statute: (1) whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose "especial" benefit the statute was enacted; (2)
whether the legislative history indicates an explicit or implicit intent to create or deny a
private action; (3) whether implication is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legis-
lative scheme; and (4) whether the area is one traditionally relegated to state courts for resolu-
tion. This author agrees with a recent law review note which concluded that the United
States Supreme Court's present construction of the implication doctrine does not support an
implied private action under the FCPA. See Note, Effictive Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REv. 561, 570-76 (1980). But cf. Note, supra note 12, at 188 n.179.
50 See, e.g., Gustman, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Transactional Analysis, 13 J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 367, 381, 400 (1979).
51 Id.
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
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whether they may incur liability through actions of a personal or non-
company business nature. 53
The Act is also unclear regarding a company's liability for im-
proper payments by subsidiaries. The Act's prohibitions against bribery
specifically exclude foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations
operating abroad.54 Thus, section 103 requires that the United States
issuer at least authorize or participate in the prohibited conduct, even if
it is a postpayment authorization. The Act may impose liability, how-
ever, if the parent company benefits from a bribe made by its foreign
subsidiary and has knowledge that the bribe was made. Consequently,
it could be argued that, by not intervening to prevent the illegal pay-
ment, the parent implicitly approved the bribe.55
The liability of a company for the actions of joint venture partners
and prime contractors is also ambiguous under the Act. If a firm is a
minority partner in a joint venture, it may be unable to control the pay-
ment of bribes to foreign officials in spite of its efforts to the contrary. 56
Again, it is unclear whether the Act would impose liability in such cir-
cumstances. Arguably, the company would have neither approved nor
acted directly or indirectly in furtherance of the illegal payment. 57
A second major area of ambiguity in the Act concerns the activities
which make a transaction "corruptly in furtherance" of gaining influ-
53 The Senate bill covered "any officer, director, employee or stockholder thereof acting on
behalf of such issuer." (Emphasis added.) S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 17. The confer-
ence committee changed the wording of the bill to cover "any officer, director, employee, or
agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer. . . ." (Em-
phasis added.) H.R. REP. No. 831, supra note 10, at 12. The change in language appears to
require that only the stockholder must be acting on behalf of an issuer; an officer or director
of a corporation who acts without that corporation's authority may still be convicted under
the FCPA. The Act makes clear that employees' and agents' liability is predicated upon the
issuer's conviction. See supra notes 41 and 45; see also Note, supra note 12, at 166-68. Some
courts have questioned whether a corporation can be held criminally liable for the implicitly
authorized acts of its officers. Note, supra note 12, at 166 n.41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972). The
federal courts have held corporations criminally liable where an officer has acted within the
scope of his employment, regardless of whether his conduct was expressly authorized. See,
e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
54 H.R. REP. No. 831,supra note 10, at 13-14. The original House Bill, H.R. 3815, would
have extended the coverage of the FCPA to domestically controlled foreign subsidiaries. The
conference committee, however, decided not to extend coverage to foreign subsidiaries in or-
der to avoid jurisdictional and enforcement questions and unnecessary antagonisms with for-
eign governments. See 123 CONG. REc. 36307 (1977).
55 123 CONG. REC. 36307-08 (1977); see also Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 57
HARV. Bus. REv. 32, 48 (1979).
56 See Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 253.
57 Georges, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure." A Quest for Clarity, 14 CoR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 1, 61-62 n.15 (1981).
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ence.58 In order to impose liability under the Act, the plaintiff must
prove that the payment was made "corruptly.1 59 Although the legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended for the corruption require-
ment to be used to exclude persons engaged in essentially benign
transactions, the full parameters of the corruption requirement are not
clear60 For example, the Act does not indicate the extent to which the
word "corruptly" protects business entertainment of foreign officials and
courtesy gifts. A literal reading of the Act suggests that any gifts to for-
eign officials or any entertainment would be prohibited if intended to
induce the foreign officials to use their positions in order to direct busi-
ness to the payor. Congress, however, may not have meant to prohibit
small gifts that are of insufficient value to induce a government official
to misuse his position, especially in countries where such gifts are cus-
tomary.6 ' In addition, it is unlikely that Congress intended to prohibit
tours of company offices and factories, including transportation, meals,
hotel, and entertainment expenditures, in order to familiarize and en-
courage foreign officials to use the company's methods and facilities.6 2
Yet the Act does not specifically exclude or discuss these payments, and
thus leaves United States businesses without guidelines as to the conse-
quences of engaging in these transactions.
A third area of ambiguity concerns the distinction between ministe-
58 See supra note 41.
59 The burden of proving that the payment was made corruptly rests upon the prosecutor
or plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
60 The Senate Report explained the corruption requirement as follows:
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer, promise or gift, must
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully
direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a
favorable regulation. The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose, an in-
tent to wrongfully influence the recipient.
S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 10. The House Report set forth a somewhat similar
explanation:
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or
gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position; for example,
wrongfully to direct business to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legislation,
or regulations, or to induce a foreign official to fail to perform ari official function. The
word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose such as that required under 18
U.S.C. 201(b) which prohibits domestic bribery. As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b), the word "cor-
ruptly" indicates an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the recipient. It does not
require that the act be fully consummated or succeed in producing the desired outcome.
H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 7-8. The domestic bribery statute has been interpreted by
the courts as requiring an intentional violation motivated by evil. See, e.g., United States v.
Strand, 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480-81 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Elden &
Sableman, Negligence Is Not Cormplion The Scienter Requfrement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 819, 823-28 (1981).
61 Georges, supra note 57, at 60 n. 13; see Sprow & Benedict, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 Some Practical Problems and Suggested Procedures, 1 CORP. L. REv. 357, 361 (1978).
62 Benedict, supra note 61, at 361 (1978).
1982] 1751
COMMENTS
rial and discretionary officials. It is clear from the language and legisla-
tive history of the Act that the prohibition of payments to foreign
officials does not apply to those "whose duties are essentially ministerial
or clerical."'63 Thus, bribes made as "grease money" or facilitating pay-
ments to expedite a bureaucratic, clerical activity are legal, while bribes
made to persons with discretionary powers in order to influence their
actions are illegal.64 The terms "grease" and "facilitating" payments,
however, are not defined in the Act. Arguably, these terms could in-
clude bribes to customs officials to obtain lower-than-normal duties or
bribes to license-granting authorities to obtain import or export licenses
or industrial property protection that is not allowed by law. On the
other hand, Congress may have intended to limit these payments to, for
example, gratuities to customs officials to speed the processing of docu-
ments or payments to obtain adequate police protection.65
The distinction between ministerial and discretionary officials
raises even further questions. An investigation by a company to deter-
mine the nature and scope of a government employee's duties will not
provide immunity against the imposition of sanctions after a later, con-
trary determination by the Justice Department.66 In the event that a
clerical official exceeds his ministerial functions, however, the FCPA
"business purpose" test would probably be applied. This test requires
that the payment must be intended to assist a company in "obtaining,"
"retaining," or "directing" business.67
The language of the Act appears to indicate that if the duty to be
performed by the foreign official is not intended to obtain, retain, or
direct business, but merely to move a matter more quickly to an even-
tual act or decision, a facilitating payment made to the official would be
permitted. In contrast, the legislative history of the Act appears to indi-
cate that in determining whether a payment to a particular person is
exempt from the Act, the focus should be on the nature of the foreign
63 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2. A foreign official is defined as "any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person
acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency, or
instrumentality." Id.
64 H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 8; S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 10.
65 S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 10.
66 H.R. REP. No. 831, supra note 10, at 12.
67 For the text of the provision see supra note 41. The business purpose test, however,
excludes payments to obtain favorable regulation or legislation. Thus, the bribe paid by
United Brands to officials in the Honduran government for the purpose of obtaining a reduc-
tion in the export tax does not fall within the prohibitions of the Act. See supra note 13. The
legislative history does not provide a rationale for this omission. Congress may have intended
to exclude all payments which did not relate to obtaining, retaining, or directing business.
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official's job, not on the particular act that he is paid to perform.8
Thus, a payment to a foreign official with discretionary power would
arguably be illegal, even if the action paid for was essentially ministerial.
It is also important to note that the distinction between prohibited
and non-prohibited payments does not depend upon the amount of the
payment. 69 The Justice Department, however, may infer that larger
amounts are intended to be passed on to higher officials. 70 Thus, busi-
nesses engaging in such transactions may have to consider not only the
recipients of the payments, but also the size of the payments.
A fourth area of ambiguity concerns the prohibition of payments to
any person "while knowing or having reason to know" that all or a por-
tion of the payment will be passed on to a foreign official, political
party, party official, or candidate. 71 This provision prohibits indirect
payments to foreign officials through intermediaries, such as consultants
and sales agents, who sometimes pass on part of their fees to government
officials in order to achieve a desired sale.7 2 Local agents often play a
critical role in obtaining business overseas and in some countries, the use
of agents is required by law.73
The legislative history of the FCPA does not indicate under what
circumstances a company should have "reason to know" that an agent is
making illegal bribes. Thus, many companies are uncertain about the
extent to which they must investigate an agent's practices. Others fear
that in countries where bribery is commonplace, the "reason to know"
provision will be presumed in all cases.74 Some companies are requiring
their sales agents to sign agreements in which they pledge not to bribe
foreign officials in their work for the company. The Justice Depart-
ment, however, has stated that a mere contract provision, without other
affirmative precautionary steps, will not insulate a company from liabil-
ity for its agents' improper actions.
7 5
68 Georges, supra note 57, at 59 n. 12. Georges notes that this conclusion is supported by
Senator Tower's remarks:
We discussed the possibility of excluding payments to secure the performance of essen-
tially ministerial or clerical duties but rejected it in favor of a test that would look to the
type of officer involved - not to the particular duty he was being asked to perform.
H.R. REP. No. 831, supra note 10.
69 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, has placed a $1,000 limit on pay-
ments which can be made by the Lockheed Corporation. This amount appears to define the
FTC's limit for "grease" or facilitating payments. 347 TRADE REG. REP. 7 (CCH) (Aug. 21,
1978).
70 Georges, supra note 57, at 60 n.12.
71 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3).
72 Set supra notes 29 and 30; S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 10.
73 Georges, supra note 57, at 61 n.14.
74 Id.
75 Id.; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES REVIEW PROCEDURE, RE-
LEASE No. 80-03 (Oct. 29, 1980).
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The fifth major area of ambiguity in the Act concerns payments to
fbreign political parties and candidates for public office. The FCPA for-
bids these payments for the purpose of obtaining, retaining, or directing
business. 76 A political contribution made by an issuer, or person con-
nected with an issuer, is not proscribed if it is not intended to influence
the official in obtaining, retaining, or directing business or if it is legal in
the country where made.77 Thus, the intention of the payor is
determinative.
The Act, however, does not indicate what factors must be present
to impose liability. Contributions made with the best motives could still
be considered corrupt if made under certain circumstances. Thus, un-
less the payor is motivated solelv by an interest in the general policies of
the government or the strengthening of a particular party, he or she
could be in danger of violating the Act.78
Finally, even though a payment may fall within one of the several
exceptions to the Act, a number of other laws may still impose liability.
Department of Justice officials have indicated that they will not be con-
strained by the "intent of Congress," as manifested by the exemptions
under the Act, and will prosecute companies that make payments pro-
scribed by other statues. 79 Thus, many companies are concerned that
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(B), (3)(B), 78dd-2(a)(1)(B), (2)(B), (3)(B).
77 Id. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
78 Georges, supra note 57, at 62 n. 16. For example, the awarding of a major contract to a
company that made a substantial contribution to a political candidate or party might indi-
cate an improper motive. Thus, a company might be advised to refrain from seeking govern-
ment contracts either before or soon after an election. As Georges noted, this would put
companies in the anomalous position of desiring the election of a candidate for general polit-
ical reasons, but being financially penalized by his success at the polls. Id.
79 See Note, supra note 19, at 701-02, where the author noted that a number of domestic
statutes require the disclosure of questionable payments. For example, the Export-Import
Bank requires all companies dealing with buyers financing purchases through the Bank to
report all commissions included in the contract price. Deliberate falsification of reports vio-
lates 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). In addition, the International Security Assistance Act and the
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976), require reports of payments, including
political contributions and agents' fees, made or offered to secure the sale of governmental
and commercial military items abroad. The Foreign Military Sales Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751
(1976), also requires disclosure to purchasing governments and the Department of Defense of
any agent's fees included in the contracts. Fees considered questionable by the Defense De-
partment or unacceptable by foreign governments are not allowed as costs under such con-
tracts. Moreover, the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2399 (1976), requires firms
conducting business under its jurisdiction to report all commissions connected with sales to
the Agency for International Development. Companies who make questionable payments
may also violate the general criminal statutes proscribing mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341, 1343 (1976), and conspiracy to defraud the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1976).
Additionally, under 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976), United States citizens are prohibited from at-
tempting directly or indirectly to influence the conduct of a foreign government in relation to
disputes or controversies with the United States. Finally, since payments that are lawful
under the Act, such as "grease" payments, may be material to the purchasing decision of an
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conduct which would be lawful under the FCPA could nevertheless be
prosecuted under other statutes.
The ambiguities in the Act are of special concern to business be-
cause of the lack of interpretive case law or enforcement history under
the FCPA. Companies fear not only the risk of successful prosecution
under the Act, but also the possibility of being charged with FCPA vio-
lations and receiving the resultant adverse publicity. Thus, in order to
prevent companies from foregoing otherwise legitimate business oppor-
tunities, Congress is attempting to clarify the ambiguities of the Act.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA
Ambiguities in the law are often clarified by interpretive case law
and enforcement history. Enforcement of the FCPA by the SEC 0 and
the Justice Department,8 however, has been sporadic. There are many
reasons why the two agencies have brought so few actions.82 For exam-
ple, the necessary evidence may be in the possession of a United States
citizen living abroad, a foreign subsidiary, or even a foreign national
who has no link to the United States. If this obstacle is surmounted, the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination may still prevent the
use of subpoenaed documentary evidence against individual officers and
directors. Moreover, depositions taken abroad may not withstand sixth
amendment claims to the right of confrontation. Finally, any attempted
prosecution, whether or not successful, may cause American companies
to lose business or may damage United States foreign relations. 83
This lack of enforcement history has left many companies in a legal
void. Fearing that uncertainties about the scope of the Act's prohibi-
tions were causing United States companies to "forego legitimate export
opportunities," President Carter, in 1978, directed the Justice Depart-
ment.to provide the private sector with written guidance concerning its
enforcement priorities.84 As a result, the Justice Department issued a
investor, they may be subject to disclosure. Arguably, the willful failure to report a material
payment could constitute criminal fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). See SEC Report,
supra note 2, at 16-32.
80 See SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 461 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Aminex Re-
sources Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,458 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC
v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., [1978] SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-I.
81 See United States v. Kenney Int'l Corp. [1979] 516 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-2, A-
3 (D.D.C. 1979); United States v. Carver, [1979] 498 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12 (S.D.
Fla. 1979).
82 See Lashbrooke, supra note 22, at 23640.
83 Id. at 240. See also Note, supra note 49, at 569-70.
84 Slade, Foreign Corrupt Payments: Enforcing a Mulliateral Agreement, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J.
117, 118 (1981); Statement on United States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1633 (Sept. 26, 1978).
1982] 1755
COMMENTS
public announcement of enforcement priorities8 5 and established a Re-
view Procedure "permitting any party covered under [the anti-bribery
provisions of the Act] to seek a statement of the Department's present
enforcement intention concerning proposed business conduct [under
those provisions] ."86
Under the Review Procedure, the Criminal Division, upon receiv-
ing a request for review of a proposed transaction, may (1) state its pres-
ent enforcement intention under sections 103 and 104 of the Act with
respect to the proposed business conduct;8 7 (2) decline to state its present
enforcement intention;"" or (3) take such other position or action as it
considers appropriate.8 9 The Criminal Justice Division may also, in its
discretion, refuse to consider a review request.90
Although the subject of the review request must be an actual trans-
action, the request need not involve only proposed conduct. The Crimi-
nal Division, however, will only comment on the portion of the request
which concerns proposed conduct; it will not comment on past transac-
tions.91 Review requests must be specific and "contain in detail all rele-
vant and material information bearing on the conduct for which review
is requested and on the circumstances of the proposed conduct. ' 92 Un-
like review letters under the Antitrust Review Procedure,93 review letters
issued under the FCPA Review Procedure are binding upon the Crimi-
nal Division,94 but only as to the parties joining the request. 95 A review
letter, however, will not bind or obligate any other agency.96 Thus, the
85 Slade, supra note 84, at 119 n. 10. Former Assistant Attorney General Phillip Heymann
stated that the Justice Department, in determining whether to prosecute a case under the
FCPA, would attach the most significance to: (1) whether the bribe was paid in a market in
which all the other competitors are United States companies; (2) whether the bribe was paid
in a country making an effort to enforce domestic legal prohibitions against such conduct; (3)
the level of the official bribe; (4) the ratio of the bribe to the underlying economic transaction;
(5) the past conduct of the corporation; and (6) the level of the corporate officials involved in
consummation of the bribe. Id.
86 28 C.F.R. § 50.18 (1981).
87 Id. § 50.18(h). For a more detailed discussion of the FCPA Review Procedure see
Georges, supra note 57, at 70-86.
88 28 C.F.R. 50.18(h); see U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT RE-
VIEW PROCEDURE RELEASE Nos. 80-01, 80-02, 80-04 (Oct. 29, 1980).
89 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(h).
90 Id. § 50.18(d).
91 Id. § 50.18(b).
92 Id. § 50.18(0.
93 Id. § 50.6(9) provides, "[a] business review letter states only the enforcement intention
of the [Antitrust] Division as of the date of the letter, and the Division remains completely
free to bring whatever action or proceeding it subsequently comes to believe is required by the
public interest."
94 Id. § 50.18(k).
95 Id. § 50.18(e); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., supra note 88, at 80-01, 80-02, 80-04.
96 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(1).
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SEC could bring a civil enforcement action against a party, subject to its
jurisdiction under section 103 of the Act, for a transaction already
cleared by the Criminal Division.
Recently, the SEC has stated that it will not take enforcement ac-
tion alleging violations of section 103 against any party that has received
clearance from the Justice Department under the Review Procedure. 97
The SEC, however, did not obligate itself to refrain from enforcing the
Act's accounting and recordkeeping requirements. Thus, the Review
Procedure states that a review letter shall not "in any way alter the re-
sponsibility of the party or parties to comply with the accounting re-
quirements of section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." 98 For
parties such as "domestic concerns," which are not subject to SEC juris-
diction, clearance by the Criminal Division would "provide complete
protection from enforcement action" under the FCPA.99 A review let-
ter, however, would not prevent the Justice Department from prosecut-
ing parties to the transaction under other laws, unless "specifically cited
in the particular review letter." 10o
Although the Criminal Division is bound only with respect to the
requesting party, it attempts to provide guidance to the business com-
munity at large by publicizing the core of individual review requests
and its decisions on them. Thus, the Justice Department publicly re-
leases information describing the identity of the party or parties submit-
ting a review request, the general nature and circumstances of the
proposed conduct, and the Criminal Division's enforcement decision. 1'0
In order to enable some parties to keep all of a portion of the informa-
tion supplied to the Criminal Division confidential, the Review Proce-
dure includes a provision whereby a party may ask the Criminal
Division "to delay or to refrain from ever making publicly available
parts of a review request, and part or all of any information or docu-
ments submitted in support of the review request."10 2
The FCPA Review Procedure is intended to clarify the ambiguities
97 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-18255 (CCH) FED. SEc. L. REP. 26,629
(Nov. 12, 1981).
98 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(m).
99 Georges, supra note 57, at 72.
100 28 C.F.R. § 50.18!).
101 Id. § 50.18(o)(2).
102 Id. § 50.18(o)(1). To avoid public disclosure, a party must: (1) specify precisely the
information that it asks not to be made public; (2) state the minimum period of time during
which nondisclosure is considered necessary; (3) justify the request for nondisclosure by show-
ing that the material consists of trade secrets or commercial and financial information that is
privileged and confidential under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, or is ex-
empt under any other provision of Act. Id. § 50.18(o)(1). If the Justice Department deter-
mines that grounds for nondisclosure do not exist under the FOIA, the Department will
notify the party submitting the review request of its determination at least seven days before
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in the Act that have posed unintended obstacles to legitimate foreign
trade by United States businessmen.10 3 Individual review would theoret-
ically eliminate ambiguity by providing a definitive statement of the
government's position on the application of a law to a particular course
of action. 0 4 Until recently, however, companies under the jurisidiction
of both the Justice Department and the SEC could not rely solely upon
Justice Department approval due to the divided enforcement responsi-
bilities under the Act. Although the SEC still refuses to participate in
the administration of the Review Procedure, to formally coordinate its
interpretation and enforcement of the Act with the Justice Department,
and to provide guidance on its own, 10 5 the SEC's policy not to prosecute
any party for bribery, where that party has received Justice Department
clearance, permits an assured means of resolving ambiguities in the en-
forcement of the FCPA.
The SEC's policy, however, does not improve the Review Proce-
dure's ability to offer general guidance to the business community at
large. The review releases represent only the position of the Justice De-
partment. Although the SEC has agreed not to sue companies which
receive favorable review letters, this does not necessarily imply agree-
ment with Justice Department review decisions. Thus, the SEC could
bring an enforcement action against a company that relied on a Justice
Department decision but did not itself seek individual review, even
though the company's international transaction was identical to the
conduct previously approved.10 6 At best, therefore, the Review Proce-
dure releases can only provide predictability as to how the Justice De-
partment will apply the provisions of the FCPA. 0 7
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FCPA
A. HISTORY AND GENERAL PROVISIONS OF S. 708
Shortly following the adoption of the FCPA, Wallace Timmeny,
the deputy director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement and the offi-
any information is released. Id. This seven-day period allows companies to seek judicial ac-
tion to prevent disclosure of information considered by the company to be confidential.
to3 Georges, supra note 57, at 79.
104 Id.
105 Id.; FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 26,628 (Aug. 28, 1980). The SEC has emphasized,
however, that while it does not formally coordinate its interpretation and enforcement of the
Act with the Justice Department, "it work[s] closely with the Justice Department in adminis-
tering the bribery prohibitions." Id. The SEC has stated that it is "aware of no difference of
substance between the Commission and the Department of Justice with respect to interpreta-
tion of the bribery prohibitions." Id.
106 Georges, supra note 57, at 82. For other problems with the Review Procedure, see id. at
82-86.
107 Id. at 82.
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cial responsible for enforcing the anti-bribery provisions of the Act, set
forth his views regarding enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions.108
He advised United States businesses to follow three main principles in
interpreting the FCPA. First, American businesses must investigate all
"red flags." "Red flags" include not only allegations subject to investi-
gation, but also general indications, such as the "knowledge" that bribes
are common in the country in which they conduct business. 109 Second, a
United States concern has a duty not only to investigate "red flags"
waved in its face, but also to search for "red flags" in the absence of
suspicious circumstances. °10 Third, a business that cannot assure itself
that its foreign affiliates are not engaged in bribery has -a duty to stop
doing business in the foreign country. t1
Many people, including Cabinet-level officials of the Reagan Ad-
ministration, point to Timmeny's analysis as evidence that the Act is
overbroad and unreasonable, 1 2 This broad interpretation, especially of
the "reason to know" provision, has been the impetus for proposed legis-
lation intended to narrow the reach of the anti-bribery provisions. 113
Critics of the Act and proponents of the pending legislation contend
that the FCPA stifles United States overseas business, forces United
States businesses to act like private detectives, permits prosecutors to
second-guess businesses, and imposes a vague negligence standard.1 14
Senator John Chafee (Republican, R.I.) introduced the proposed
legislation, S. 708, on March 12, 1981. After a subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs reported the
bill favorably, it passed the Senate in November, 1981. It is currently
pending before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 15 Al-
though the new legislation would rename the FCPA the "Business Ac-
counting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act," the goal of the
proposed bill remains the same: outlawing bribery by United States
corporations to foreign officials.' 1 6 At the same time, however, the bill
attempts to solve the problems which have arisen under the Act as a
result of its lack of clarity.11 7
108 See Elden & Sableman, supra note 60, at 820-21; Timmeny, SEC Enforcement ofthe Foreign
Corrup! PracticesAct, 2 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. ANN. 25 (1979). In a standard disclaimer,
Timmeny indicated that the views expressed in his article were his own and not necessarily
those of the SEC, the agency for which he was Deputy Director of Enforcement. Id.
109 Elden & Sableman, supra note 60, at 821; Timmeny, supra note 108, at 31.
110 Timmeny, supra note 108, at 31.
Ill Id.
112 Elden & Sableman, supra note 60, at 821,
113 See mufira note 8.
114 Elden & Sableman, supra note 60, at 821-22.
115 See supra notes 8 and 9.
116 S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 3, 19.
117 Id. at 19.
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In its report accompanying S. 708, the Senate Committee stated
that, as a result of the FCPA's interpretive problems, United States busi-
nesses have lost legitimate export opportunities and have incurred un-
reasonable costs in attempting to comply with the Act's provisions.118
Thus, the preamble of the proposed bill sets forth four conclusions:
(1) the principal objectives of the FCPA are important to the nation;
(2) exporters should not be exposed to conflicting demands from diverse
enforcement agencies; (3) compliance practices should be considered in
balance with other national objectives; and (4) the United States should
seek appropriate international cooperation to solve the problem of cor-
rupt payments." 9 Consistent with these conclusions, the proposed bill
amends the FCPA's accounting standards, 20 consolidates enforcement
of the Act's anti-bribery provisions in the Justice Department,' 2' clari-
fies the major ambiguities of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, 22 and
requires the President to pursue negotiations to establish international
cooperation in the prohibition of bribery.' 23
B. CLARIFICATION OF THE ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS
The proposed bill continues the prohibition against foreign bribery,
but it is intended to clarify the ambiguities which have caused confusion
and lost sales' 24 among United States businesses attempting to comply
with the FCPA. In so doing, however, the legislation opens a number of
118 Id.
1t9 Id.
120 S. 708,sufira note 8, § 4; S. REP. No. 209,supra note 8, at 10, 11-16, 20. The changes in
the accounting standard contained in the proposed bill will not be discussed in this paper.
121 S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(a); S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 11, 16, 20.
122 S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(b)-(f; S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 10-11, 16-19, 20-21.
123 S. 708,supra note 8, § 10; S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 11, 19, 22. Discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of bilateral and multilateral agreements is beyond the scope of
this paper.
124 During the hearings on S. 708, there was some testimony that the claim of lost export
sales had never been substantiated. See, e.g., Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 414-16 (testi-
mony of William A. Dobrovir). Dobrovir cited the Wall Street Journal as reporting, on Febru-
ary 28, 1977, that corporate fears of business losses because payoffs had stopped had proved
groundless. Id. at 415. Two years later, on February 19, 1979, Newsweek reported that "many
American executives contend that they are losing business to foreign competitors," but also
cited a report which concluded that "the impact on foreign sales hasn't been all that dramatic
thus far." Id. In 1981, the General Accounting Office reported to Congress on the impact of
the FCPA, as found in a survey of 250 companies. Id. at 416. The GAO found that 30% of
the companies said they "had lost overseas business because of The [sic] Act," while a major-
ity reported "little or no effect on their overseas business." Id. The GAO admitted that claims
of lost sales are "difficult, if not impossible to substantiate and quantify" and noted that
United States exports have increased since the Act. The GAO study concluded that the prob-
lem apparently was one of perception: "American companies believe that the Act puts them
at a competitive disadvantage overseas." Id ; see also id. at 40-65; infia note 134 and accompa-
nying text. But cf. Hearings on S.708; supra note 7 at 386-87 (testimony of United States Trade
Representative William E. Brock).
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loopholes which should be tightened before the bill is passed by the full
Congress.
Under the current Act, sections 103 and 104 are identical in all
respects except one: section 103 concerns only "issuers"'' 25 - i.e., corpo-
rations registered under section 12 or required to file under section 15(d)
of the 1934 Act - while section 104 only applies to "domestic con-
cerns."126 The proposed legislation would repeal section 103 of the
FCPA and redefine "domestic concern" to include issuers.1 27 Thus, the
proposed section 104 would encompass both sections 103 and 104 of the
FCPA. The separate provisions for issuers and domestic concerns exist
because enforcement responsibility for the different entities is divided
between the Department of Justice and the SEC. Since S. 708 consoli-
dates enforcement responsibility,' 28 the streamlining of sections 103 and
104 should not create any problems.
Under the current sections 103 and 104, the liability of officers and
directors is unclear. Specifically, the wording of the provisions raises the
question of whether officers and directors must be acting on behalf of
the company to incur liability under the Act.129 It is clear from the
language of the proposed section 104, however, that officers, directors,
employee, and shareholders must be acting on behalf of the domestic
concern in order to be liable.' 30 Although this revision narrows the
reach of the FCPA, it is a more reasonable provision,, if literally con-
strued, and is probably consistent with the intent of Congress, under the
original sections 103 and 104, to impose liability only where the officers,
directors, or employees are acting on behalf of the company.
I Liabiizyfor Third-Party Payments
No provision of the FCPA has caused American business greater
problems than the provisions prohibiting payments to "any persons,
while knowing or having reason to know" that a foreign official will
ultimately receive the payment. 31 This provision has caused serious
problems because it imposes criminal liability on United States compa-
nies for the actions of others and does so without establishing clear stan-
125 Se supra note 41 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 33 and 43 and accompanying text.
127 S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(a).
128 See infia notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. The language of the new section 104
covers "any officer, director, employee, or shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such domes-
tic concern." The language of sections 103 and 104 of the FCPA covers "any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer."
See supra note 41 for the full text of section 103 of the FCPA.
130 S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(b).
131 See supra note 41.
1982] 1761
1762 COMMENTS [Vol. 73
dards for the companies to follow. These companies are required to
determine with certainty that third parties will not engage in certain
conduct and to risk criminal prosecution if their judgment is found to be
incorrect.
During the hearings on S. 708, Theodore Sorensen, a strong advo-
cate of the FCPA in 1977, stated that
no other provision of the Act has caused more confusion and deterred more
export activity on the part of many an American businessman who had no
intention to pay bribes but a great fear of finding himself unintentionally
liable for the unauthorized, unforeseeable and unknown acts of the com-
pany's independent agents whose misdeeds, some prosecutor might some
day allege, that businessmen had "reason to know." t3 2
Moreover, as the Senate Committee noted, "[t]he problem becomes par-
ticularly acute for small businesses [which] must do virtually all of their
overseas business by means of foreign agents, over whom they may have
very little or no control. '1 33
To illustrate the disincentives created by the FCPA's "reason to
know" standard, United States Trade Representative William E. Brock
provided case histories.1 34 For example, a multinational United States-
based engineering company spent approximately $250,000 to evaluate
its potential market in Latin America. Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela
were considered open markets for exporting engineering services and es-
tablishing local service branches. One of the major reasons the com-
132 Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 405.
133 S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 5.
134 Id. at 6-7. See also Hearings on S. 708, supra note 7, at 385-87, where other examples
were reported as follows:
The United States Embassy in Muscat, Oman, reported that a United States firm
lost a $20 to $30 million contract solely because of the time delays needed to investigate
sales agents and assess their responsibility for third parties under the FCPA.
In Liberia, United States firms will not risk hiring local agents because of potential
liability under the FCPA for their unsanctioned actions. Instead, they have come to rely
on more expensive expatriates with fewer ties to local business people. Thus, not only has
the cost of business in Liberia gone up, United States firms have lost their competitive
edge.
The United States embassy in the United Arab Emirates reported that overlap be-
tween business and government has been a problem for United States firms seeking to do
business there. At best, the overlap has made it more difficult for United States firms to
begin operations - in many cases, months pass while home office legal staffs review
potential sponsorship agreements. Some firms have signed relatively ineffective agents
rather than violate the FCPA, or at worst, have decided not to enter the market at all.
At the same time, the United States image in the host country suffers because many
reputable businessmen resent what they perceive as a questioning of their own honesty in
business dealings.
In Qatar, only one of the state's fourteen cabinet ministers has no known business
ties, and United States firms often fear that business payments may be construed as illicit
payments to foreign officials. American firms there generally avoid agents in government
positions, but they are then restricted to less effective agents with fewer business connec-
tions throughout the region.
Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 385-87.
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pany chose not to expand was its uncertain liability under the FCPA for
the activities of independent agents and subcontractors. Moreover, the
cost of policing such activities would have markedly lessened its price
competitiveness. Another example involved a large Utah firm which
had encountered difficulty in its efforts to obtain a local representative.
After many discussions, the company narrowed the field to one Omani
firm which it believed would best represent its interests. The firm, how-
ever, was unable to reach an agreement due to potential problems aris-
ing under the FCPA. Since the firm's business involved multimillion-
dollar contracts concerning proprietary technology, lost exports from
the United States may have been substantial.
In order to define the "reason to know" standard more precisely
and to narrow its reach, the new legislation would make it unlawful for
any United States corporation "corruptly" to "direct or authorize, ex-
pressly or by a course of conduct," a third party to bribe a foreign offi-
cial. 135 The Senate Committee intended the term "course of conduct,"
used with the term "authorize," to refer to those situations in which a
company, through its words or course of conduct, has demonstrated its
intent that a corrupt payment be made. 136 The deletion of the phrase
"reason to know," however, sparked a great deal of controversy and elic-
ited much testimony.
In Senator Chafee's original proposal, section 104 banned only
those third-party payments which a United States company "directs or
authorizes."'' 37 Many of those who testified at the Senate hearings be-
lieved that this standard was at the opposite extreme of the "reason to
know" standard. Theodore Sorensen predicted that the proposed lan-
guage would invite "a wide-open return to the knowing wink and preg-
nant nod."' 38 Philip Heymann, former Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, testified that
"[u]nless a corporation is so foolish as to direct or authorize the payment
of bribes at a high level and relatively explicitly, no one is likely to be
considered responsible."'' 39 Wallace Timmeny contended that "[t]he
obvious problem with the 'directs or authorizes' standard is that it en-
courages an ostrich or a head-in-the-sand approach . . . a company
could knowingly acquiesce in the improper conduct of an agent, or con-
sciously avoid involvement in the awareness of an agent's activities, and
avoid responsibility for and improper payments that may take place.""14
135 S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(b).
136 S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 17.
137 Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 8.
138 Id. at 402, 405.
139 Id. at 424.
140 Id. at 435, 438.
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As a result of this and other testimony, the Senate Committee
amended Senator Chafee's bill to include the phrase "directs or autho-
rizes, expressly or by a course of conduct."' 41 This amendment was in-
tended to provide a new standard of corporate liability, midway
between the "reason to know" standard and the "directs or authorizes"
standard. As the Senate Report accompanying S. 708 explained, a com-
pany's refusal or failure to respond to an agent's suggestion or request
that a corrupt payment be made would violate this section, as would a
company's continuing employment of an agent known to the company
to have made corrupt payments in the preceding two years in violation
of applicable United States law or those of the country in question. 142
To clarify the proposed standard the Senate Report also provided
examples of permissible conduct. For instance, the mere fact that a
company does business in a country where corrupt payments are com-
mon, or employs an agent with personal relationships with government
officials in the country where the company seeks to do business would
not establish a prohibited course of conduct. Similarly, the payment of
a commission that is higher than is customary would not, by itself, vio-
late this section without evidence that the increased amount is intended
to effect a corrupt payment. 143
Although this proposed standard is more precise than the "reason
to know" test under the FCPA, a number of issues are left unresolved.
For example, it is unclear whether mere knowledge that an agent would
pay a bribe on behalf of the company satisfies the course of conduct
standard and whether this knowledge is intended to be actionable. It is
also unclear whether a reasonable person is liable if, under the circum-
stances, he should have known that a bribe would be paid. 44
Under the original language of the proposed bill - i.e., "directs
and authorizes" - these questions would probably have been answered
in favor of the corporation. With the addition of the "course of conduct"
language, however, a loophole has been created which might exclude
from liability firms which have knowledge of possible illegal payments
but choose not to investigate the transactions to determine whether such
payments are in fact being made. The firm's inaction would not neces-
sarily be equivalent to a standard of "directs or authorizes, expressly or
by a course of conduct" since the firm technically would not know
whether illegal payments are occurring.
To avoid this ambiguity, additional language should be included in
the proposed bill which would force companies to take action where
141 S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(b).
142 S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 17.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 28-29 (letter of Senator Proxmire).
1764 [Vol. 73
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
illegal payments are suspected. Thus, the provision could be drafted
along the following lines: "Section 104(b):145 a domestic concern vio-
lates subsection (a)'46 by circumventing the proscriptions thereof (i)
where a payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value by any
person is made corruptly to a foreign official1 47 in connection with activ-
ities within and for any of the purposes set forth in subsection (a), (ii)
where the domestic concern corruptly directs or authorizes, expressly or
by a course of conduct, such payment, gift, offer, or promise, or (iii)
where the domestic concern obtains knowledge that such a payment, gijt, offr, or
promise may be occurring andfais to investigate and take action to prevent such a
payment, gift, ofr, or promise." [Author's recommendations in italics.]
The new standard would resolve the "knowledge" issue which the
language of the proposed bill leaves open. It would cover situations in
which a company recieved information directly-or received various
items of information which would lead a reasonable person to suspect -
that a foreign subsidiary, or an independent person or company acting
as a sales representative of an American business overseas, was engaging
in illegal payments. The firm would then have the responsibility to in-
vestigate the matter. If it found the information to be valid, the firm
would be required to take action to prevent the illegal transaction--e.g.,
by firing the sales representative who made the payment. If this new
language is adopted together with a clearer definition of "illegal pay-
ments" as discussed below, the major ambiguities inherent in the cur-
rent FCPA will be resolved while the original goals of the Act remain
intact.
145 Section 104 of S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(b), provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 104(a) It shall be unlawful with respect to activities in the interstate or foreign
commerce of the United States for any domestic concern, or any officer, director, em-
ployee, or shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, corruptly to
pay, give, offer, or promise, directly or indirectly, anything of value to any foreign official
for the purpose of-
(1) influencing such foreign official to act or make a decision in his official capacity,
including a decision to fail to perform his official functions, in violation of the recipient's
legal duty as a public servant; or
(2) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof in violation of the recipient's legal duty as a public servant; in
order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person.
(b) A domestic concern violates subsection (a) by circumventing the proscriptions
thereof where a payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value by any person is
made corruptly to a foreign official in connection with activities within and for any of
the purposes set forth in subsection (a),
and where the domestic concern corruptly directs or authorizes, expressly or by a course
of conduct, such payment, gift, offer, or promise.
146 Id.
147 "Foreign official" is defined in S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(0(2) to include officers and




2. Exemptions for Certain Payments
During the hearings on the FCPA, Congress recognized the distinc-
tion between bribes and "grease" or facilitating payments. They heard
testimony that "[m]any companies have indicated that 'facilitating' pay-
ments to low-level officials are customary and legal in certain parts of
the world and that continuation of such payments is necessary in order
to transact business."' 48 The reports of both the Senate and the House
committees stated that the "statute does not . . . cover so-called grease
payments." 149 On the floor of both Houses, key legislators involved in
the enactment of the FCPA made similar remarks.1 50
Congress intended the FCPA to deal indirectly with the issue of
facilitating payments by focusing on the type of official involved. Spe-
cifically, "foreign official" is defined not to include "any employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical."'151 Under the
FCPA, payments to a foreign government employee who falls within
this exclusion are outside the statutory proscription.
This approach, however, has proved somewhat arbitrary and quite
difficult to apply in practice due, in part, to the multitude of relation-
ships and responsibilities of employees in foreign countries.1 52 Even in
the United States federal government, it is difficult to know when an
official has "essentially ministerial or clerical" duties. The problem is
acute in foreign countries where the duties of government employees
may be less clearly articulated or not readily available in published
form. 153
The proposed bill employs a different approach. While the FCPA
seeks to define facilitating payments in terms of recipients, the new legis-
lation would define such payments in terms of their purpose. 54 It pro-
vides for five categories of exceptions: (1) facilitating or expediting
payments to a foreign official, the purpose of which is to expedite or
secure the performance of a routine government action as opposed to
one involving judgment as a significant factor; (2) items lawful under
the laws of the foreign official's country; (3) items which constitute a
courtesy, or a token of regard or esteem, or are given in return for hospi-
148 Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 10, at 20.
149 S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 8.
150 See 123 CONG. REC. 38601-02, 38778, 36304 (statements of Senator Tower, Congress-
man Devine, and Congressman Eckhardt, respectively).
151 Emphasis added. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
152 S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 18.
153 Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 151 (statement of the Emergency Committee for
American Trade).
154 S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 18.
1766 [Vol. 73
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
tality; (4) expenditures associated with the selling or purchase of goods
or services or with the demonstration or explanation of products; and (5)
ordinary or customary expenditures associated with the performance of
a contract.155
Although the proposed bill defines more clearly, and excludes from
the Act's coverage more explicitly, facilitating or "grease" payments,
courtesy and hospitality gifts and expenses, and disbursements incurred
in connection with product or operation demonstrations or explana-
tions, it also creates several loopholes. For example, the proposed bill
loosely includes in the definition of excluded gifts anything that is "in-
tended" as nothing more than an act of courtesy, esteem, or reciprocal
hospitality. It would be difficult to prove that the most lavish bribe was
not "intended" in an innocent vein if the donor papers the record with
care. 156
In addition, where the payment is customary rather than specifi-
cally permitted by a local law or regulation, it may not be easy to deter-
mine its legality. Presumably, the burden would be on the government
to prove that a payment made was not customary. The prosecution's
ability to produce such evidence will be limited in many cases, as will
the defendant's ability to produce opposing evidence.
The new bill would also exclude from its coverage payments which
are lawful in the recipient country. Under the current Act, there is con-
fusion as to whether the actions of United States businesses should be
judged under United States legal standards or those of the foreign coun-
try. The proposed bill makes clear that American businesses will not be
prohibited from engaging in conduct that is lawful under the applicable
local laws and regulations. This amendment, for example, would allow
corporate political contributions in those countries where they are en-
tirely legal.157 Similarly, the provision would permit United States com-
panies to retain the services of individuals who serve as part-time public
servants and are authorized by local law to perform outside activities
provided that they avoid conflicts of interest.
This is clearly a huge loophole. In 1976, the Law Library of Con-
gress prepared several studies which demonstrated that many developed
and developing countries had legislation prohibiting bribery of public
officials to secure business. 158 Since the strictness of each country's laws
155 Id.
156 Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 405 (testimony of Theodore Sorensen).
157 Id. at 152 (statement of the Emergency Committee for American Trade).
158 Id. at 52; see also LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A COMPILATION OF BRIBERY AND EXTOR-
TION LAWS IN OPEC COUNTRIES (No. 76-1076LL); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BRIBERY LAWS




and the degree of enforcement undoubtedly differ, American companies
could circumvent Congressional prohibitions. Imposing United States
legal standards on American businesses, however, without altering them
for international commercial transactions, could hinder these transac-
tions to a greater degree than necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Act.
For example, corporate political contributions are not permitted in
the United States but are allowed in other countries. To forbid Ameri-
can corporations from making such contributions could place them at a
disadvantage if such contributions are customarily made by foreign cor-
porations doing business in the country. To resolve this problem, Con-
gress should establish a monetary limit on such contributions. American
businesses would be required to report all such contributions; any pay-
ment in excess of the limit would be subject to approval by the Justice
Department. Similarly, Congress should require American businesses to
report the name and salaries of part-time foreign public servants whose
services are retained by American companies. In this latter case, it
would be unrealistic to impose a limit on the amount of money to be
paid to these part-time foreign public servants. Justice Department offi-
cials could review the compensation on a case-by-case basis. The offi-
cials could, inter alia, compare the salaries paid to the company's other
employees with the salary paid to the part-time foreign official. The
American company could, of course, provide arguments and documen-
tation supporting their compensation figure. If the Department of Jus-
tice still considered the salary to be excessive, however, it would have to
be reduced.
A third problem involves the Senate Committee's attempt to distin-
guish situations involving government action in which the exercise of a
foreign official's judgment is a significant factor. The Committee stated
that judgment in this context refers to the decisions by a foreign official
regarding whether, or on what terms, to award new business or to con-
tinue business with a particular party. 59 A foreign official, however,
even at the highest level and bearing responsibility for allocating a con-
tract to one of several competitors, could very simply structure a bribe
from one competitor so that it appeared to be a payment for "expedit-
ing" his decision. 16°
To avoid this problem, the proposed bill should again establish an
annual dollar limit to be placed on the exempted payments. For exam-
ple, any payment of less than $1,000 to a foreign official, as defined in
159 S. ReP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 18.
160 Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 426 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann).
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the proposed bill, would not be a violation of the statute.' 61 Thus, in
determining whether a payment is exempted from the prohibitions of
the proposed legislation, there would be no need to become entangled
with questions of custom or intent. This minimal value test, of course,
could be easily amended to adjust for inflation or other economic
circumstances.
During the hearings on S. 708, some witnesses recommended that
the list of payments to be explicitly defined and exempted from the
prohibitions should include extortion. 62 The legislative history of the
FCPA indicates an intent to exclude it, but by example defines it too
narrowly to be meaningful.163 Although it is difficult to distinguish ex-
tortion from bribery, criminal codes have drawn the line. 164 As Mr.
Sorensen noted during his testimony, "[s]ome foreign payoffs are genu-
inely coerced, not only from businessmen threatened with injury of their
persons or property but from those threatened-by government officials
or others, even their own agents-with the loss of their entire
investment."165
Since extortion is such a serious crime and carries heavy penalties,
it is unlikely that American companies would attempt to characterize an
otherwise illegal payment as extortion. To do so would, for example,
submit the foreign sales representative to criminal penalties for extor-
tion, thus defeating any advantage gained by making the payment. It
appears, therefore, that an exemption for extortion would not create any
unforeseen problems or loopholes.
3. The Exclusivity Provision
The Senate Report accompanying S. 708 indicates that the pro-
posed legislation would preclude the possibility of criminal prosecution
on the grounds that the mail or wire fraud laws have been violated as a
result of a foreign corrupt payment. 166 This exclusion avoids inappro-
priate overlapping and conflict between the FCPA and the mail and
wire fraud statutes which could occur if the latter were extended to pro-
scribe conduct not comprehended, expressly or otherwise, under the
FCPA. 167 Thus, the intent of the Senate Committee appears consistent
with the general principles of statutory construction: i.e., while the gov-
161 See, e.g., id. at 405, 426, 438 (statements ofTheodore Sorensen, Philip B. Heymann, and
Wallace L. Timmeny, respectively).




166 S. 708, supra note 8, § 7; see also S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 21.
167 See Hearings on S 708, szpra note 7, at 433 (testimony of Harvey L. Pitt).
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ernment should not be unduly restricted in applying a variety of federal
laws to reprehensible conduct, if Congress isolates offensive conduct and
imposes prohibitions on that conduct, the government should not apply
generalized statutes to prohibit conduct which Congress did not ex-
pressly proscribe.168
The exclusivity language of S. 708, however, could be read as
prohibiting the application of all other statutes to instances of foreign
bribery.169 As one witness noted during the hearings on S. 708, the pro-
vision "appears to immunize murder or obstruction of justice if carried
out in furtherance of a corrupt payment."1 70 In order to clarify this
ambiguity, the language of the proposed bill should indicate that ac-
tions are immunized only if they would be legal but for the intent and
effort to bribe foreign officials. If, however, the intent of the exclusivity
provision is to preempt certain specified statutes, (e.g., the mail and wire
fraud statutes), the provision should state with particularity those stat-
utes which are intended to be preeempted.17'
C. CONSOLIDATION OF ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
A major amendment contained in the proposed bill would place in
the Justice Department all jurisdiction for enforcement of the anti-brib-
ery provisions.172 The SEC would remain responsible for civil enforce-
ment of the internal accounting controls and relevant securities laws.
Under the current Act, the SEC has authority to enforce the civil provi-
sions of the anti-bribery provisions against "issuers," while the Justice
Department is responsible for enforcing the civil and criminal provisions
against "domestic concerns." The SEC has indicated that it does not
oppose such consolidation.' 73
During the hearings prior to the enactment of the FCPA, a number
of reasons were advanced for the division of enforcement responsibilities:
(1) the SEC has traditionally been effective in protecting the investing
public by instituting civil litigation; (2) the SEC is in a relatively supe-
rior position to investigate reporting companies alleged to have bribed
foreign officials because of its immediate access to company books and
periodic filings; (3) retaining SEC jurisdiction in the case of reporting
companies will avoid costly duplication of effort; (4) the SEC had been
effective in discovering foreign bribery prior to the FCPA; and (5) be-
168 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980).
169 See, e.g., supra note 79.
170 Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 426 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann).
171 Id. at 547 (statement of the American Bar Association).
172 S. 708, supra note 8, § 5(b).
173 Securities Exchange Release No. 34-18255, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 26,629 (Nov.
12, 1981).
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cause some investigations are likely to be politically sensitive, it would
be preferable to have investigations conducted by an independent
agency answerable to Congress rather than the Executive branch. 174
Congress also expected close cooperation between the SEC and the Jus-
tice Department at the earliest stage of any investigation to ensure that
the evidence needed for a criminal prosecution would not become
stale. 175
Although the arguments in favor of dual jurisdiction are somewhat
persuasive, stronger arguments can be made in opposition to this policy.
The history of joint enforcement of the Act does not support the effi-
ciency and expertise arguments, especially in light of the criticisms re-
garding the FCPA Review Procedure. Further, the lack of SEC
participation in the Review Procedure is a strong indication that the
cooperation between the agencies which Congress intended has not been
achieved. Moreover, the investigation of illegal payments to foreign offi-
cials is at best only indirectly related to the SEC's primary responsibility
to protect investors. Not only is there likely to be duplication of efforts
and resulting governmental inefficiency, but the Justice Department al-
ready has sufficient expertise in investigating and prosecuting domestic
bribery cases. 176
Persuaded by arguments against dual jurisdiction, the Senate Com-
mittee proposed a consolidation of enforcement responsibilities. 77 The
majority of comments received during the hearings on the proposed leg-
islation, including those of the SEC, were not opposed to this consolida-
tion. 17 8 It is clear, that this consolidation would provide greater
certainty in interpretation and enforcement by eliminating the confu-
sion that results from overlapping jurisdiction, exacerbated by one
agency's unwillingness to be bound by the interpretations of another.
In response to criticism regarding the lack of general guidance pro-
vided to businesses under the Justice Department's Review Procedure,
the proposed legislation gives the Justice Department's Review Proce-
dure more authority and imposes stricter requirements. 179 Specifically,
the Department's statement that proposed conduct would not violate
the Act would be "final and binding on all parties" which would pre-
sumably include the SEC and the Internal Revenue Service. Moreover,
in contrast to the current procedure, responses to requests for statements
174 H.R. REP. NO. 640, supra note 2, at 9; see also Note, supra note 16, at 376.
175 Id. at 377. H.R. REP. No. 640; supra note 2, at 10; S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 12;
Hearings on S 708, supra note 7, at 339.
176 H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 2, at 20-2 1; see also Note, supra note 16, at 377.
177 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 708, supra note 7, at 80, 205, 244, 331, 338, 448, 513, 540.
178 Id.
179 S. 708, supra note 8, § 8.
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of enforcement intentions would be due, from the Justice Department
within thirty days. t0 Finally, documents and all materials submitted in
regard to a Review Procedure request would be exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act.' 8 '
These amendments meet the basic criticisms of the Justice Depart-
ment's Review Procedure. Presumably, firms will be able to act more
quickly on proposed business transactions and without fear of disclosure
of confidential information. The proposed changes would therefore
make the Review Procedure more certain and thus, more useful.
V. CONCLUSION
The underlying objectives of the FCPA have generally been sup-
ported by the business community, the Congress, and the public. Yet,
ambiguities in the Act have caused many businesses to call for the rescis-
sion rather than the reformation of the Act. This has occurred because
many American corporations may be foregoing legitimate international
business transactions in order to avoid possible civil and criminal penal-
ties for violations of ambiguous provisions of the Act. Congress is at-
tempting to resolve this problem by amending the FCPA.
The proposed bill clarifies many of the ambiguities of the Act and
narrows its reach in certain areas. Moreover, it generates certainty by
consolidating enforcement responsibility in the Department of Justice.
Yet, the bill also creates a number of loopholes. It is therefore necessary
for Congress to revise this pending legislation. For example, Congress
should further clarify its "directs and authorizes, expressly or by a course
of conduct" standard in order to force companies to take action where
illegal payments are suspected.' 82 Moreover, Congress should establish
a dollar limit or a minimal value test for those payments to foreign offi-
cials which are allowed under the proposed Act.' 83
Although some businesses may object to these more specific restric-
tions, the overriding policy of prohibiting corporate bribery of foreign
officials should prevail. Outlawing such bribery is crucial to, inter alia,
180 The Review Procedure presently provides that responses to review requests should be
given within 30 days: "The Criminal Division will make every reasonable effort to respond
. . . within 30 days after receipt of the review request and of any requested additional infor-
mation and documents." 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(i). Requests for "additional information" could
be extensive and cause the review process to last for months. Such delays could enable for-
eign competitors to gain an advantage. Thus, the proposed legislation provides that "[t]he
Attorney General shall issue opinions, within thirty days, in response to requests from domes-
tic concerns, regarding compliance with the requirements of the provisions of section 104 of
this Act." S. 708, supra note 8, § 8.
181 S. REP. No. 209, supra note 8, at 11.
182 See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
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preventing the distortion of commercial competition and avoiding for-
eign policy problems. 184 If the suggested changes are incorporated into
the proposed bill, large loopholes will be tightened, and the original
goals of the FCPA will be furthered.
TAMARA ADLER
184 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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